Intentional Walk Tactics: When to Put a Runner On

Intentional Walk Strategy: When Does Putting a Runner On Make Sense?

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An intentional walk (IBB) deliberately gives the batter first base, so the defense starts every intentional-walk decision by accepting a cost: another baserunner.

That means an intentional walk is not automatically smart just because a superstar is hitting or first base is open.

The real question is:

Does avoiding the current hitter improve the defense’s chances enough to justify putting another runner on base?

Run-expectancy data show why the answer is often no.

Using MLB data cited in an analysis of common intentional-walk situations, putting an extra runner on increased expected scoring in every listed base-out state. For example, with one out and a runner on second, expected runs increased from 0.71 to 0.98 after adding a runner at first. With two outs and a runner on second, the figure increased from 0.34 to 0.47.  

Intentional walks can still make sense—but usually because of an unusually large hitter/matchup difference or a specific late-game win-probability situation.

What Is an Intentional Walk Today?

Since 2017, MLB managers can signal an intentional walk to the home-plate umpire instead of requiring the pitcher to throw four intentional balls.

The batter is then awarded first base.

The change altered the mechanics of the intentional walk, but not its fundamental strategic tradeoff:

You avoid one hitter, but voluntarily give the offense another baserunner.

MLB introduced the no-pitch procedure as a pace-of-play measure. In the season immediately before the change, there were 932 intentional walks in 4,856 games, or only about 0.19 per game, so MLB acknowledged that the change itself would have relatively little effect on total game time.  

The Main Cost of an Intentional Walk: Run Expectancy

The easiest way to understand intentional-walk strategy is through run expectancy.

Run expectancy estimates how many runs a team is expected to score from a particular combination of:

  • Runners on base
  • Number of outs

Adding a runner generally increases the offense’s expected scoring.

Consider several situations from MLB’s analysis:

Before the IBBExpected runs beforeAfter putting batter onExpected runs after
Runner on 2nd, 1 out0.711st & 2nd, 1 out0.98
Runner on 2nd, 2 outs0.341st & 2nd, 2 outs0.47
1st & 3rd, 1 out1.22Bases loaded, 1 out1.63
1st & 3rd, 2 outs0.52Bases loaded, 2 outs0.75
2nd & 3rd, 1 out1.37Bases loaded, 1 out1.63
2nd & 3rd, 2 outs0.62Bases loaded, 2 outs0.75

In every example, adding the intentional walk increases expected runs for the offense.  

That’s the baseline a manager has to overcome.

The question isn’t simply:

Is this batter dangerous?

It is:

Is the difference between this batter and the next matchup large enough to compensate for the additional baserunner?

When Can an Intentional Walk Make Sense?

1. The Current Hitter Is Much Better Than the Next Hitter

This is the clearest reason.

If an elite hitter is followed by a substantially weaker batter, avoiding the elite hitter may offset the cost of adding a runner.

But the difference needs to be meaningful.

MLB’s analysis of intentional-walk strategy notes that the matchup gain needs to be large enough to overcome the increase in average run expectancy caused by the free pass.  

Walking one dangerous hitter simply to face another dangerous hitter usually provides much less benefit.

2. One Run Matters More Than Multiple Runs

Run expectancy isn’t always the only objective.

Suppose the game is tied in the bottom of the ninth.

The defense doesn’t particularly care whether the opponent would eventually score one run or four runs:

one run already ends the game.

That makes win probability more relevant than average runs allowed.

A strategy that slightly increases the chance of a multi-run inning could theoretically still be worthwhile if it reduces the probability of allowing the single run that ends the game.

This is why intentional-walk decisions should be evaluated using both:

Run Expectancy (RE)
and
Win Probability (WP).

Baseball Savant’s 2026 Game Strategy Explorer now allows users to examine both measures for game situations using data from the previous 10 seasons.  

3. The Walk Creates a More Favorable Matchup

A manager may intentionally walk a hitter because the next matchup is substantially better.

That can involve:

  • Batter quality
  • Pitcher handedness
  • Platoon advantage
  • Pitch-type matchup
  • Strikeout probability
  • Ground-ball tendency

But matchup advantage shouldn’t be evaluated in isolation.

The benefit still has to outweigh the additional baserunner.

Does Setting Up a Double Play Justify an Intentional Walk?

This is one of baseball’s traditional arguments for the IBB:

Put a runner on first and create a force or double-play opportunity.

The defensive advantage is real.

But it doesn’t automatically make the intentional walk statistically favorable.

For example, MLB’s run-expectancy analysis found that with one out and runners on second and third, expected runs increased from 1.37 to 1.63 when the bases were intentionally loaded.  

Historical research reaches a similar conclusion.

An analysis of bases-loading intentional walks during the 1999 postseason found that the pre-walk situations were expected to produce 20.1 runs, while 26 runs actually scored following the 15 intentional walks—a 29% increase over the pre-walk expectation. The sample is small and shouldn’t be treated as a universal rule, but it illustrates the risk of deliberately filling an empty base.  

Creating a force play therefore has value, but it isn’t a free defensive advantage.

You’re buying that force play by giving the offense another baserunner.

Does Having Two Outs Make an Intentional Walk Better?

Often, it makes the cost smaller—but not zero.

With two outs, only one more out is required to escape the inning, so the additional runner may matter less than it would with zero or one out.

For example:

Runner on second, one out

0.71 expected runs → 0.98 after adding first base.

Difference: +0.27

With:

Runner on second, two outs

0.34 → 0.47

Difference: +0.13.  

So the run-expectancy penalty is smaller with two outs in this example.

That makes it easier for a large batter-quality or matchup advantage to justify the walk.

But “two outs + first base open” still doesn’t automatically mean the correct decision is to walk the batter.

What About Loading the Bases Intentionally?

This is where managers need to be particularly careful.

Loading the bases creates force plays at every base, but it also means:

  • A walk scores a run
  • A hit-by-pitch scores a run
  • Many singles can score multiple runners
  • The pitcher has less margin for command errors

Run-expectancy data generally reflect that additional danger.

That doesn’t mean loading the bases intentionally is never correct.

A sufficiently large difference between the current hitter and the next one—or a specific walk-off situation—can change the decision.

But “setting up the force” alone is not enough evidence that the move is advantageous.

Real Example: Walking a Superstar With the Bases Loaded

One of the most extreme intentional-walk strategies is voluntarily allowing a run.

Barry Bonds famously received a bases-loaded intentional walk in 1998, when Diamondbacks manager Buck Showalter chose to force in a run rather than let Bonds hit.

More recently, Angels manager Joe Maddon intentionally walked Corey Seager with the bases loaded in 2022.

These cases look bizarre because the defense knowingly gives the opponent a run.

But they demonstrate the underlying logic of every intentional walk:

The manager is comparing the expected damage from the current hitter with the expected damage after giving him first base.

The strategy is unusual precisely because intentionally adding runners—and especially forcing in a run—normally carries a substantial cost.

What Does Recent Postseason Evidence Show?

Recent postseason data provide another useful reality check.

An MLB analysis of intentional walks during the 2025 postseason examined 23 intentional walks.

After those walks:

  • 11 plate appearances ended in batted-ball outs
  • 4 in strikeouts
  • 3 in singles
  • 3 in doubles
  • 2 in walks
  • 1 in a sacrifice fly

At least one run scored after the intentional walk 11 times, just under half of the cases.

Average scoring after those intentional walks was 0.91 runs per inning.  

But that does not automatically prove the managers made bad decisions.

The hitters being avoided included stars such as Aaron Judge, Shohei Ohtani and other elite hitters. The correct comparison isn’t “IBB vs. an automatic out.”

It’s:

face the dangerous hitter with fewer runners

versus

face the next hitter with an additional runner.

That’s the actual strategic decision.

A Better Intentional-Walk Decision Framework

Instead of using rules such as:

“Always walk the superstar with first base open.”

use four questions.

1. How much better is the current hitter than the next one?

A small difference usually isn’t enough.

A massive difference can be.

2. How much does adding the runner increase run expectancy?

This is the immediate cost.

Baseball Savant’s Game Strategy Explorer can now estimate this using historical MLB situations.  

3. Is the objective preventing runs or preventing one specific run?

Early in a game, minimizing total expected runs usually matters more.

In a walk-off situation, preventing one run becomes the entire objective.

That can change the optimal decision.

4. Does the walk create a meaningful matchup advantage?

Consider:

  • Next hitter quality
  • Platoon advantage
  • Pitcher profile
  • Ground-ball/strikeout probability
  • Available pinch hitters

Only after considering all four does “first base is open” become strategically meaningful.

Intentional Walk vs. Pitching Around

These are related but different strategies.

An intentional walk guarantees that the batter reaches first.

Pitching around means throwing cautiously—often outside the hitter’s best zones—while still leaving open the possibility that the hitter:

  • Chases
  • Makes weak contact
  • Strikes out
  • Or eventually walks

Pitching around therefore preserves some chance of recording an out, but it also carries the risk of a location mistake to the dangerous hitter.

The right choice depends on how much damage the defense believes that mistake could cause.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does an intentional walk always increase run expectancy?

For normal base-out states, adding another baserunner generally increases the batting team’s expected runs. That’s why an intentional walk needs some compensating advantage—usually a substantially better matchup or a specific win-probability situation.  

Is an intentional walk smart with two outs?

It can be.

The run-expectancy cost of adding a runner is often smaller with two outs because only one more out ends the inning. But the quality of the current and next hitter still matters.

Should you intentionally walk a hitter to set up a double play?

Not automatically.

Creating a force and double-play opportunity has value, but loading an additional base also increases offensive run expectancy. Both effects need to be considered.

Are intentional walks more useful late in games?

Game state becomes more important late.

In particular, a tie game in the bottom of the ninth changes the objective because allowing one run ends the game. Win probability can therefore matter more than average run expectancy.

Where can I check run expectancy for an intentional-walk situation?

Baseball Savant’s Game Strategy Explorer provides run-expectancy and win-probability estimates based on MLB data from the previous 10 seasons and can be used to examine intentional-walk decisions.  

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